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VISUALIZING FORESEEABILITY 
PATRICIA K. FITZSIMMONS* AND BRIDGET GENTEMAN HOY** 
We ought not to have been surprised that our torts class differed from the 
average first-year law school course; our professor began the first class by 
reading a Ralph Nader interview.  He caught our attention and from that day 
forward taught the law of torts in a decidedly unconventional manner. 
Throughout the semester, our instructor presented the field of tort law as a 
series of doctrines existing on a continuum,1 stretching from intentional torts 
with discrete elements (including a mental state that must be proven before 
imposing liability) at one end, to absolute liability at the other end.  We learned 
that judges decide where on the continuum to place a certain disfavored or 
prohibited act by “collapsing” tort doctrine, emphasizing or de-emphasizing 
elements of the doctrine to suit their needs.2  We considered whether decision-
makers act as “gatekeepers” by denying application of tort liability to whole 
classes of acts or “tweakers” who make adjustments along the continuum on a 
case-by-case basis.  And we learned that foreseeability is best described as 
“strawberry shortcake.” 
The day this revelation was made began like any other.  Our professor was 
pacing around the auditorium-style classroom, climbing up and down the steps 
on either side as we discussed the relevance of foreseeability in determining 
whether a defendant’s act was the cause of a plaintiff’s injury.  Should all 
foreseeable results be attributed to an act?  What about results that were caused 
directly by the defendant’s actions, but were not reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of the act?  In the midst of this discussion, a student asked for an 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful for this unique opportunity 
to contribute to the “Teaching Torts” special issue.  Thanks are due to my family for their 
encouragement during my law school career, and to my co-author for her friendship and support. 
** J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law.  It is a special treat to participate in the 
Law Journal’s “Teaching” series, initiated with “Teaching Contracts” in Volume 44.  See 
Teaching Contracts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1193 (2000).  The opportunity has allowed me to reflect 
on the challenges and successes of my three years at the Saint Louis University School of Law, 
and in doing so, I am reminded that my success would have been greatly hindered if not for the 
patience of family and friends. 
 1. See, e.g., JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 163-97 
(2d ed. 1997) (containing sections titled Categorization of Socially Desirable Activities and 
Doctrinal Subcategories and Characterization). 
 2. See Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717 (1993). 
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explanation of how fact-finders determine whether a certain result was 
foreseeable.  Our instructor responded by proclaiming: “What is 
foreseeability?  Foreseeability is strawberry shortcake!”  Needless to say, this 
declaration took us all by surprise. 
Like many legal terms, foreseeability is hard to define clearly.3  The word 
“foreseeable” has unique legal meaning; unfortunately, it also has a common 
meaning and that, ultimately, is what confuses things.  Foreseeability is an 
attempt to predict at what point the “causal relationship between [one person’s] 
conduct and [another person’s] injury is too attenuated, remote, or freakish to 
justify imposing liability.”4  This prediction must be called something, and 
borrowing “foreseeable” from the common lexicon undoubtedly seems a 
logical choice.  However, any term could have been chosen because 
“foreseeable” in a legal context means much more than what the average first-
year law student may expect.  In other words, a foreseeable act may just as 
well be called “strawberry shortcake.”5 
As in any torts class, we studied foreseeability in the contexts of duty, 
breach and causation.  Under each discrete element of negligence, 
foreseeability played a role.  In the duty analysis, the concept of foreseeability 
arose at least twice: Justice Bird’s foreseeability test found in Bigbee v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.6 and the Rowland/Weirum factors enumerated in 
Rowland v. Christian7 and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.8  In Bigbee, 
California Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird “collapsed” duty into the breach 
and causation analyses, allowing the jury to determine whether a duty existed 
based on the foreseeability of the result.9  Her approach embraced hindsight 
and an application of the law on a fact-sensitive, case-by-case basis.10  On the 
other hand, the earlier California Supreme Court cases of Rowland v. Christian 
and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. advocated the use of foreseeability as one 
factor among many used in a cost/benefit analysis of risk allocation.11  The 
 
 3. For a discussion of “famous court decisions and numerous scholarly articles” which have 
attempted to define at what point an act is or is not foreseeable, see JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 203-04 (1996). 
 4. Id. 
 5. This, of course, is our interpretation.  Our Torts professor may very well have had other 
intentions.  Any misunderstanding is admittedly due to our own shortcomings as newcomers to 
the field of torts. 
 6. 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983). 
 7. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
 8. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). 
 9. Bigbee, 665 P.2d at 952-53. 
 10. “[F]oreseeability is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes 
whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] 
would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.”  Id. at 952. 
 11. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), reprinted in 
PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 693-99 (listing factors to be considered). 
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Rowland/Weirum approach serves a gatekeeping function in that a judge’s 
determination of whether or not a duty exists can keep an entire class of 
actions from falling under the aegis of tort liability.12 
Under the breach analysis, we learned that foreseeability was the focal 
point of risk contextualization.  The risk created by an act determines whether 
performing the act was unreasonable—hence, a determination of the 
foreseeability of the risk must be made by a court before deciding to impose 
tort liability for the performance.  For example, in Hill v. Yaskin,13 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
In order to ascertain the existence vel non of a duty owed by either defendant 
in the circumstances before us, it is necessary to determine whether or not 
probable harm to one in the position of this injured plaintiff . . . should 
reasonably have been anticipated from defendant’s conduct.  The issue of 
foreseeability in this sense must be distinguished from the issue of 
foreseeability as that concept may be said to relate to the question of whether 
the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the ultimate injury 
to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable result so as to constitute a 
proximate cause of the injury.  Simply put, the distinction is between 
foreseeability as it affects the duty determination and foreseeability as it is 
sometimes applied to proximate cause, a critical distinction too often (because 
too easily) overlooked.14 
Finally, foreseeability made a mess of what naïve first-years would simply 
call “causation.”  We saw that different courts applied various levels of 
foreseeability when determining if an injury was proximately caused by a 
defendant’s conduct.15  In The Wagon Mound I,16 the court used a straight 
foreseeability test, holding the defendant liable only for those injuries that were 
foreseeable at the time the act occurred.  We learned that this was actually a 
duty issue, collapsing the elements of negligence.  The court expanded this 
concept of foreseeability in The Wagon Mound II,17 holding that so long as the 
 
 12. The Rowland/Weirum “factors have been used frequently by California judges 
confronted with challenging duty questions.  Other jurisdictions have borrowed these factors or 
use similar ones.”  DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 112 n.3. 
 13. 380 A.2d 1107 (N.J. 1977), reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 240-45. 
 14. Hill, 380 A.2d at 1109 (emphasis added). 
 15. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 3, at 203-17. 
 16. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound I), 
[1961] A.C. 388, reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 901-05 (holding the defendant not 
liable for injuries after spilled oil was ignited on water because the consequence was not 
reasonably foreseeable). 
 17. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co. Pty. (The Wagon Mound II), [1967] 
A.C. 617, reprinted in part in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 905-06 (finding the defendant 
liable for damage resulting from the same fire as in The Wagon Mound I because although the 
risk of fire was low, the potential harm was great, and a “reasonable man would have realized or 
foreseen or prevented the risk”). 
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same general type of risk was foreseeable at the time the act occurred, 
proximate cause existed.  Finally, In re Polemis18 taught that direct cause was 
the only appropriate standard, ignoring foreseeability considerations altogether 
(and collapsing proximate cause into but-for cause). 
Soon, we realized that what we understood foreseeability to mean in a non-
legal sense was far too simplistic when applied to legal questions.  As amateurs 
at the law, we, like other first years, wanted to place fact patterns in neat legal 
categories.  The confusion surrounding the legal definition of “foreseeability” 
ultimately illustrated that legal concepts are not composed of orderly 
compartments, but rather are interwoven, abstract and loose.19 
Much to a first-year law student’s dismay, this interweaving of the law is 
celebrated.  The law is not well served by narrowly defining every legal term 
as a first-year student may expect.  Rather, it allows one concept, like 
foreseeability, to apply to vastly different fact patterns.  The infinite scenarios 
encountered by attorneys and judges demand an open-ended approach to 
solving legal problems, and therefore demand the avoidance of restrictive legal 
terms.  This idea, of course, is not novel and is certainly not specific to 
foreseeability.  The need for flexibility in the law has been recognized from the 
beginnings of our legal system.  In McCulloch v. Maryland, for instance, 
Justice Marshall declared that the Constitution could not explicitly spell out the 
powers granted by it, or else it “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, 
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.”20  Rather, “its great 
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the 
objects themselves.”21 
To the readers of this essay, and to anyone who has met the challenge of 
being a “One L”22 with even the slightest success, the proposition that the law 
must be flexible is far from earth-shattering.23  Nevertheless, to a first-year law 
student who is trying to keep her head above water, this fundamental notion is 
easily lost in the reading, outlining and memorizing shuffle.  For many, 
recognizing the subtle ideas underlying the more manageable legal doctrines 
 
 18. 3 K.B. 560 (1921), reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 898-900 (finding 
defendants liable under a direct causation theory where a dropped plank created a spark, igniting 
petrol fumes and destroying a ship). 
 19. In his contribution to this “Teaching” issue Professor Jerry Phillips notes this confusion, 
asking why in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), Cardozo “confuse[s] 
generations of law students by talking about duty instead of foreseeability.”  See Jerry J. Phillips, 
Law School Teaching, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 727 (2001). 
 20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977). 
 23. Readers of Professor Phillips’s essay will note he prefers to “work with elasticizing 
judicial concepts” and therefore will be unsurprised by our thesis.  See Phillips, supra note 19, at 
726. 
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takes several semesters24 and requires an opportunity to reflect on the concepts 
which were initially too foreign to fully comprehend.25 
Perhaps our professors give us more credit than we deserve and imagine 
that we see the big picture with more clarity than is possible so early in our 
legal endeavors.  A professor approaching a first-year course such as Torts 
should not be afraid to spell out fundamental notions of the law—such as the 
need for flexibility in defining legal concepts—throughout the semester rather 
than waiting and hoping that students will be able to turn the light on to the 
broad picture themselves.  This is not to say that first-year students need to be 
spoon-fed, for the intellectual challenge of “learning the law”26 is not only 
welcomed, it is a necessity for one who aspires to solve legal problems and 
“think like a lawyer.”  That being said, reinforcing legal subtleties can only aid 
in opening the eyes of wary first-year students who are likely bogged down in 
the search for tidy definitions that can be memorized and indiscriminately 
applied. 
The sometimes tedious process of visualizing the broader legal picture is, 
to be sure, an integral component of the law school experience.  In upper-
division courses, many professors take advantage of the lessons to which first-
year students were introduced but were unable to fully appreciate at the time.27  
Each time a professor brings a second- or third-year student back to the first-
year courses by analogy or reference, the student benefits by gaining a glimpse 
of the legal web.  In the end, it is, of course, the student who must make the 
effort to look at legal concepts with a grand view, but each opportunity a 
professor can provide helps students take a step in the right direction. 
Regarding foreseeability, Torts introduced us to the concept and attempted 
to show us its flexibility.  “Strawberry shortcake” helped us look past the 
narrow definition we were inclined to apply and see foreseeability as a 
malleable standard used by judges in their roles as gatekeepers and tweakers.  
We presume many students finish their first year of law school without coming 
to this realization.  Maybe no real harm is done, but we recommend professors 
seize every opportunity to help students see the law in a new light. 
 
 24. Foreseeability appears in any number of upper-division courses, including Jurisprudence, 
Admiralty and Criminal Law (currently offered as an upper-division course at our school).  By 
the time students enroll in these courses, they are expected to have an easier time working with 
the conceptual quality of the law, spend less time trying to define everything and more time 
actually learning how to understand and apply the law. 
 25. Few students are given such an opportunity as contributing to a “Teaching” symposium 
and therefore have little occasion to reflect on what they take away from a class other than the 
substantive law taught. 
 26. This may more appropriately be described as “learning to understand the law,” as other 
articles in the special issue on “Teaching Torts” point out. 
 27. Thankfully, a number of professors at the Saint Louis University School of Law make 
generous efforts to reinforce what we learned as first-year students. 
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